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Ill Treatment as the Cause of Suicide
William Weaver*
S UICIDE IN THE UNITED STATES is becoming an ever increasing
problem. The annual rate (based on number of deaths per
100,000 population) increased steadily from 10.2 in 1955 to 11.0
in 1963,' with the only decrease being experienced in 1961.2 The
number of lives taken each year by suicide is presently more
than twice that of homicide, and almost half the number lost in
motor vehicle accidents.3 In 1962, 20,207 persons took their own
lives as compared with 20,825 in 1963.4 It must be noted, how-
ever, that statistics on suicide can never be complete, as many
thousands of cases each year go unreported due to the stigma
which society attaches to this act.5
While legislatures and law enforcement agencies are con-
stantly striving to control both motor vehicle accidents and homi-
cides, it seems that little concern is given to suicide and cer-
tainly progress in this important field has been extremely limited.
It is suspected that each year many self-inflicted deaths are
actually consequences of ill treatment by other persons, which
treatment is often cruel and inhuman, and in fact, is sometimes
with the purposeful intention of inducing another to take his
own life. Because of the very nature of the act, proof of any
causal relationship between ill treatment and subsequent suicide
is extremely difficult, since the principal is now deceased and
mere speculation is all that remains to mortal man as to the
suicide's motives for his violent act.
This paper attempts to summarize the law with respect to
the liability of one whose ill treatment of another ultimately re-
sults in the suicidal death of such other.
Perhaps the most recent case, and one that is most indica-
tive of the present feeling of the majority of courts in this
country, is Lancaster v. Montesi,6 a Tennessee case decided in
1965. In this case the mother and son of the female decedent
brought suit against the decedent's alleged paramour. The
* B.S. in S.S., John Carroll University; Fourth-year student at Cleveland-
Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
I U. S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 59
(86th ed. 1965).
2 Ibid.
3 21 Encyclopaedia Britannica 533-34 (1962).
4 World Almanac and Book of Facts, 336 (1965), although it should be
noted that there was a slight decrease from 1963 to 1964 as noted in the
1966 ed. at page 299.
5 Perr, Suicide Responsibility of Hospital and Psychiatrist, 9 Clev.-Mar.
L. R. 427 (1960).
6 390 S.W.2d 217 (Tenn. 1965).
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plaintiffs claimed that as a result of the defendant's treatment of
the deceased in forcing her to carry on an illicit affair and in-
flicting physical beatings upon her, the defendant so controlled
the will of the deceased that she could conceive of no other
means of escape save suicide.
In deciding this case, the Supreme Court of Tennessee de-
clared that the act of suicide was an intervening cause and
could not have been reasonably foreseen by the defendant, thus
concluding that the ill treatment was not the proximate cause
of death. It appears that inclusion or exclusion of these three
factors, intervening cause, proximate cause and foreseeability,
are the major defenses interposed in actions of this type.
The majority of courts have been prone to hold that the act
of suicide is in itself an intervening cause and, as such, renders
any ill treatment inflicted by the defendant a remote cause of
death. The rule normally applied is that if a new independent
force intervenes, causing an injury, such new force will be con-
sidered the proximate cause7 of death.
An illustration of this is found in the case of Scott v. Green-
vifle Pharmacy,s wherein the court held:
The voluntary willful act of suicide of an injured person,
who knows the purpose and physical effect of his act, is gen-
erally held to be such a new and independent agency as does
not come within and complete a line of causation from the
injury to the death so as to render the one responsible for
the injury civilly liable for the death.
Dean Prosser, in his work on torts, states that the defend-
ant will ordinarily be relieved of liability by an intervening
cause which is both unforeseeable and abnormal and which pro-
duces a result which could not have been foreseen. But he fur-
ther states that the defendant will not be relieved from liability
by an intervening cause which could have been reasonably fore-
seen or which is a normal incident of the risk created?
The oft-quoted case of Salsedo v. Palmer 1o reflects this
thinking. Here, the complaint was that the defendants unlaw-
fully seized, held and assaulted the plaintiff's husband, inflicting
upon him severe physical and mental suffering which caused
him to lose control of his mind and ultimately resulted in his
suicide. The facts of this case are that the deceased, an alien,
was seized by the police, taken into custody and there held and
accused of certain crimes; that he was forced to undergo inten-
sive questioning with the culmination of these events resulting
in suicide. The District Court sustained demurrers to these al-
7 Orton v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 7 F. 2d 36 (6th Cir. 1925).
8 212 S. C. 485, 495, 48 S.E.2d 324, 328 (1948).
9 Prosser, Torts 309-28 (3d ed. 1964).
1o 278 F. 92 (2d Cir. 1921).
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legations and the Circuit Court affirmed, holding that a new
and independent cause (suicide) intervened, which could not
have been foreseen by the defendants.
This same point of law was relied upon by the Supreme
Court of Georgia which held in the case of Stevens v. Steadman,"
that a petition which alleged a conspiracy among certain mem-
bers of a corporation to cause another member to commit suicide
was subject to demurrer. Here, a letter was sent to the decedent
containing false charges and threatening to expose him unless he
submitted his immediate resignation. It was argued that de-
fendants were aware that the deceased was in failing health,
both mentally and physically, and were further aware that in all
likelihood this letter would result in decedent's suicide. The
court felt that the result could not have been the known and
natural consequence of the act charged; that it cannot be held
that any particular state of mind would naturally result from
such act of the defendant or, that such act would have the effect
of producing any particular physical reaction.
It would appear then that the courts in considering the ques-
tion of suicide have thus far been reluctant to look "beyond the
last efficient cause, especially where an intelligent and respon-
sible human being has intervened," 12 it being held that the in-
tervention of this new, independent and efficient cause "renders
the negligence of the defendant a remote cause of the injury." 13
It is well established that in order for a cause to be an ef-
fective intervening cause it must not be put into operation by
the defendant's wrongful act, but must be a completely sep-
arate, independent act such as would cause the result even
without the original wrong.14
Certainly, in cases involving suicide as in other types of
tort cases, the plaintiff in order to succeed must prove that the
negligence of the defendant was, in fact, the proximate cause of
the injury complained of. However, such proof is often rendered
more difficult in this type of case since there is generally no
physical contact between the parties, the ill treatment being of
purely mental origin and hardly susceptible to proof.
The New York Court of Appeals, in attempting to define
proximate cause, said:
The proximate cause being given, the effect must follow....
The remote cause being given, the effect may or may not
follow.15
11 140 Ga. 680, 79 S. E. 564 (1913).
12 65 C. J. S. 1198-1200, Negligence § 111 (1) (1966).
13 38 Am. Jur. 841, Negligence § 167 (1941).
14 Dougherty v. Hall, 70 Ohio App. 163, 45 N.E.2d 608 (1942).
15 Laidlaw v. Sage, 158 N. Y. 73, 100, 52 N.E. 679, 688 (1899).
Jan., 1967
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The test as to proximate causation is not in the number of
events taking place between the act complained of and the result,
but whether or not there was an unbroken connection between
these two.16 In applying this test, the courts must determine
whether the act of suicide is indeed an intervening cause or
whether it is merely a link in an unbroken chain from the ill
treatment to death.
In the Salsedo case it was held that the suicide of the pris-
oner, and not the acts of torture of the officers, was the proxi-
mate cause of death, since suicide does not ordinarily follow such
acts and could not have been foreseen. The court conceded "that
a course of either mental or physical torture, or of both com-
bined," could conceivably "produce a frame of mind that de-
sires death as a means of relief." 17 The court goes further
though, by maintaining that even given such frame of mind,
suicide would nevertheless be held to be an intervening act since
it is not considered a natural or a reasonable result which can
be foreseen.
Justice Mayer, in his noteworthy dissent in this case, stated
that when the suicide occurred the decedent had no mind, that
is, he had a complete inability to understand what he was doing,
so that as far as the decedent was concerned, the act of suicide
was no act at all and, therefore, was not an independent inter-
vening cause of death. This dissent, although rendered in 1921,
would be considered forward thinking even today.
The question we must ask is whether suicide is not many
times a natural, foreseeable and probable result of cruel and
inhumane treatment. Is it not possible for a strong-willed per-
son to goad a person of less strength into a suicidal act and even
to do so intentionally? If it can be established that the injury
was a natural and probable result and could reasonably have
been foreseen by the defendant, then the mere fact that
other forces have intervened between the negligence of the de-
fendant and the injury of the plaintiff should not absolve the
defendant of liability.'8
In recent years the courts in some of the more forward
thinking states have begun to inquire more and more into the
state of mind of the decedent in determining whether the act
of suicide will or will not be held to be an effeotive interven-
ing cause.19 Many courts hold that the act of suicide is an ef-
fective intervening cause only if a decedent was sane at the
time of the act or if he committed the act during a lucid interval,
but if decedent was insane as the result of ill treatment at the
16 Mouse v. Central Savings & Trust Co., 120 Ohio St. 599, 167 N.E. 868
(1929).
17 Salsedo v. Palmer, 278 F. 92, 99 (2d Cir. 1921).
18 65 C. J. S. 1201-02, Negligence § 111(1) (1966).
19 Cauverien v. De Metz, 20 Misc. 2d 144, 188 N. Y. S. 2d 627 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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hands of the defendant, the recent trend has been to hold such
ill treatment to be the proximate cause of suicide.20
In the case of Daniels v. New York, N. H. and H. R. Co.,
2 1
the court in the course of its opinion stated that the defendant
could be held liable if the death was a result of an uncontrollable
impulse accomplished in a delirium or frenzy without any inten-
tion to produce death or without a knowledge or understanding
of the act. This is the type of thinking used today in the courts
of the more forward thinking states. They are beginning to
recognize that there may be a causal relationship between ill
treatment and subsequent suicide and are attempting to allow
recovery where it can be proved that such ill treatment resulted
in the defendant's loss of mental faculties and ultimately in
suicide.
The course of cause and effect in cases of this type seems to
be, (1) injury, (2) loss of mind, and (3) death. It follows, there-
fore, that if No. 2 is eliminated as not being an effective inter-
vening cause but is considered instead as a link in the chain of
causation leading from the negligence of the defendant to the
death of the decedent, 2 " then recovery should be allowed. This
appears to be a more equitable approach to the matter and may,
at least, result in a plaintiff being allowed to get his case to the
jury, thus avoiding a harsh result such as was arrived at in the
Salsedo23 and Stevens24 cases, wherein the plaintiff was unable
to get past a demurrer.
The Restatement 25 has adopted this view, stating in essence
that if the negligent conduct of one results in the delirum or in-
sanity of another so as to render the negligent person liable, such
negligent person is also liable for harm done by the other to
himself while in this state, provided that the delirious or insane
condition prevents such other from realizing the nature of the
act or the risk of harm involved, or presents an irresistible im-
pulse. Thus, if A negligently injures B, causing B to become
insane and to take his own life, A's negligence may be said to
be the legal cause of B's death. This liability will not be upheld,
however, if the injury results only in recurrent attacks of
melancholia, and the suicide is committed during a lucid in-
terval. 26
The Supreme Court of New York County in 1959 rendered
a landmark decision in the case of Cauverien v. DeMetz. 27 It
20 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 9, at 320.
21 183 Mass. 393, 67 N.E. 424 (1903).
22 Salsedo v. Palmer, supra n. 10, referring to the dissenting opinion.
23 Supra, n. 10.
24 Supra, n. 11.
25 Restatement (Second), Torts § 455 (1965).
26 Ibid.
27 Supra, n. 19.
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stated that although suicide is generally considered a new and
intervening cause which breaks the causal relationship, it will
not be so considered if the person is insane at the time of com-
mitting the act and such act is committed in response to an un-
controllable impulse. In this situation recovery was allowed
under the wrongful death statute, the court holding that the
mental state was caused by the wrongful acts of the defend-
ant.
Here, the decedent, a diamond broker, took possession of a
valuable diamond on consignment, this being the usual business
procedure at the time. The decedent then gave this diamond to
the defendant retailers, also under normal business procedures,
in order that defendants could attempt to find a buyer for this
diamond. The defendants subsequently refused to return the
diamond and further refused to pay decedent for it, stating that
they would deny ever having received it. The petition in the
case alleged that the defendants maliciously and intentionally at-
tempted to cause injury to the decedent and to ruin his reputa-
tion and that the decedent, under great emotional stress as a
result of the action of the defendants, committed suicide under
an irresistible impulse.2s
This appears to have been the first actual case in which the
act of suicide was not in itself held to be the proximate cause of
death.
It thus appears that although the old defenses of interven-
ing cause, proximate cause and foreseeability are still all im-
portant, the more forward looking states are basing their de-
cisions most heavily on the state of mind of the decedent in de-
termining whether these defenses are valid as to the suicidal act
in each particular case. Stated more simply, they are looking
to see whether or not this state of mind was caused by the negli-
gence of the defendant, thus establishing an unbroken causal
relationship.
It would appear that any progress made by the courts in al-
lowing recovery under the wrongful death statutes for suicide
resulting from ill treatment would have to closely parallel the
progress made by the particular states in allowing recovery for
mental suffering and emotional distress without accompanying
physical injury, since in most cases the act of suicide is brought
on by mental or emotional distress rather than physical suffering.
It would, therefore, be expected that Ohio will lag some-
what behind the other states in allowing a recovery of this type
since Ohio presently is one of the very few states which usually
will not allow recovery for the infliction of mental suffering
without accompanying physical injury.29
28 For discussion of "Irresistible Impulse" see Eliasberg, Irresistible or
"Irresisted" Impulse? 9 Clev.-Mar. L. R. 447 (1960).
29 Young, Damages for Emotional Distress in Ohio, 15 Clev.-Mar. L. R. 51
(1966).
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol16/iss1/10
92 16 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (1) Jan., 1967
The trend of the courts may be seen in this quotation from
Magruder30 in his noted article entitled Mental and Emotional
Disturbance in the Law of Torts:
(T)he courts have already given extensive protection to
feelings and emotions. They have shown a notable adapta-
bility of technique in redressing the more serious invasions
of this important interest of personality. No longer is it
even approximately true that the law does not pretend to
redress mental pain and anguish "when the unlawful act
complained of causes that alone."
30 49 Harv. L. R. 1033, 1067 (1936).
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